Comms, Hardware and Software Solutions for Technothriller Adventurers in March, 1991

My next GURPS campaign is set on Earth and begins in March, 1991. There are no historical changes from our world, aside from inserting the PCs, any fictional NPCs, and any events, individuals, structures or objects featured, or implied, in their backstories, and which are not already historically attested. Thus, if something wasn’t available on our Earth in March, 1991, it isn’t available to the PCs.

The PCs are going to be entering countries which until recently were part of the Warsaw Pact, some of which are still nominally Socialist Republics, and most of which are in considerable turmoil, with uncertainty over the future looming large.

Long-simmering ethnic tensions have started resurfacing in the absence of the all-encompassing power of the State, rioting is endemic, there are calls for free elections and the end of the one-party system, and numerous Soviet Socialist Republics appear to be demanding independence, at least if public demonstrations are considered indicative of the will of the people. And response from the Kremlin has been late, muted and reflective mainly of the fact that there is no plan or policy for this situation.

Hand-in-hand with demands for independence comes uncertainty about basic things, such as policing and security, as well as who is or will be in charge of military forces stationed on what might soon be foreign soil, composed of men from what might be different countries in a matter of days, weeks or months.

Many people in those countries are not sure whether their life savings and pensions are still secure, or even if the State will pay them their next paycheck, not to mention whether the currency they will be paid in is going to have enough purchasing power to feed their family. This includes the people who make up the intelligence, military, police and security services.

The PCs are not there to spy on the Soviet Union or any of their former satellite countries. Or, at least, they are not there on behalf of any Western government and they are not interested in information to be used against the USSR or any Central Asian or Eastern European country. The PCs are effectively corporate headhunters working under contract and they are there to find and recruit people with expensive training in a very particular set of skills and hire them for much less than they would need to pay Western people with the same set of skills.

They are, technically, looking for several different sets of skills, but, in short, they are looking for pilots, technicians, airborne pathfinders and razvedchiki, as well as the other specialists required to establish a forward operating base from which to stage helicopters, both transport and attack helicopters, in territory they don’t yet control, or may never intend to control, as was the case during Eagle Claw (1980).

Other contractors, which may or may not include PCs, will be buying military supplies, ideally by dealing directly with the conscripts, praporchiki and officers guarding supply depots, while they have no idea if they’ll receive salaries and pensions worth anything. Best case scenario would be if they could then fly the supplies out in cargo planes bought the same way, complete with fictitious flight manifests filed fraudulently.

It would be great to have as much accurate technological detail as possible. I mean the computers tech support people in Vienna, Berlin, Helsinki, Stockholm, Istanbul or Kars might be using, the high-quality printers used to make fake official documents that look as much like the real ones as possible, the communications used between people on the ground (if any technological solution exists that would be safe enough) and their communications with their support HQ.

I’d also like to know how to equip a van driven to Berlin in order to provide support for as many of the following as practical, visual and audio surveillance, tapping into phone lines, electronic interception, Van Eck phreaking, emergency forgery of further documentation, and computer-aided intrusion, research and data searches of all kinds.

One of the things which will prove challenging is to find full names of Soviet military, intelligence and security service men with the right skill sets, based on the report from one defector or another about someone who served with them maybe a year ago, maybe a decade ago, for some of them only serving together for one operation. They have lists of hundreds of names of possible recruits, but not all of them are full names and more than half of them may be spelled differently. They’re going in there with information which comes from primary sources with excellent access. It’s just that most humans don’t remember the full names of every good helicopter pilot, scout or airborne officer they served with over a twenty year career, even if they are absolutely sure about some of the details about that operation. Memory is malleable, unreliable and sometimes the only available evidence.

Once the they’ve found the right person, they’ll need to find find phone numbers, if they have phones, and addresses for the targets. They may need to find these things in Soviet records, archives of which will mostly be on paper, but if anything like a central registry of military personnel exists in computerized form, it would simplify things greatly if access to a terminal which could access that registry could be arranged. That way, they might also identify new recruitment targets with skill sets they need and try to arrange transport to an area where many of them live, to avoid the need for long trips just to talk to one possible recruit, given the vast distances between different regions in the USSR.

The equipment to be used must be commercially available, though that may be taken to also mean anything which an expert could assemble it from commercially available components. I suppose anything Soviet which could have been acquired as part of the severance package of a defected KGB-man would also pass muster, but would imagine that by this time, commercially available Japanese radios and other electronics were far superior to top-secret Soviet electronics.

PCs who fly in to the target country with commercial airlines may have their luggage expertly searched or they may be just waved through. They’ll plan for the first and hope for the second, expecting something in between. They absolutely cannot travel with anything that gets them arrested and they should not travel with anything that alarms security services enough to break through the chaos that must reign there now and causes them to put a tail on this foreign tourist, journalist, academic, etc. If they find themselves in a situation where the best plan is using electronics which cannot be safely transported openly into the country, there are alternative methods of smuggling open, but this is, of course, much more complicated, expensive and time-consuming.

The PCs would want to have some way of communicating with each other and with a support team in the nearest safe country, including experts in Soviet technology, military procedure and capabilities, and a wide range of subjects related to their intelligence and security services. Those experts declined to come with the field teams to the USSR or other countries still nominally Socialist, something about them technically having defected from the KGB and being worried some of their former might have hard feelings about the separation package they got. Real-time would be best, but that might be impossible with the commercially available technology of the day, especially as it also needs to be fairly secure.

Among those supporting the recruiters and procurement specialists who go in the field are several tech support experts, each with their own preferences. All of them will have fairly liberal budgets when it comes to setting up temporary headquarters and they will also have influence over where to station those HQ. A balance will have to be struck between distance from the team they support, considering the range of any comms used in the field, and how good the infrastructure is in the area of the temporary HQ.

Some of those tech support people are going to be helping academics and analysts find exact information about some extremely niche subject, which may be classified. Research, aided by tech skills for database management, indexing and search functionality, will often be the most relevant area of expertise they bring. However, sometimes, PCs might need or think they need to do something which means that such a search is going to have to happen on a network where they do not legally have access.

I’d like to know what kind of setup different tech people might want in such temporary HQs, to be ready for as anything, as much as is possible. Manufacturer of the hardware, models if you know, operating systems, database storage and solutions for making searches faster and more accurate, etc.

Also, would you suggest that field recruiters and procurement specialists make use of newsgroups, BBS or other Internet precursors for their communications? Could they even find places to connect to them in the USSR? What about if they were in Poland or the Baltics?

Also, 1991 is probably too early for Area Knowledge (Internet), but how would a character represent being an active member of many tech newsgroups, BBS and networked communities, especially in being able to post a query about some arcane tech issue and get responses, sometimes in just a few minutes, some times days later?

What about being able to have someone else with access to a mainframe or supercomputer have a crack at solving your issue by brute forcing it? Is it a Contact, Contract Group or a Claim to Hospitality which allows for access to a computer instead of a guest room? Because the mutual aspect of the Claim to Hospitality very much applies, at least if you want to be able to continue to take advantage of the generosity of others with their time and electronics homes.

I’m also curious about commercially available military electronics. A lot of the Soviet equipment of the time was perfectly good military equipment, if you simply add modern electronics where they are sorely needed. Better radios (or at least add radios), better frequency-agile tactical communications, better sensors, better targeting systems, etc.

The military contractors can obtain legitimate end-user certificates, at least from Namibia and Angola, which Israel, at least, would recognize and agree to sell tactical radios, drones, FLIR and night vision devices for helicopter pilots, drivers and individual soldiers. As the MPLA in Angola was the UN recognized government at the time, even before an election, some countries who would not sell to Namibia might sell to Angola and vice versa. They might convince Finland, Japan, Sweden and some other countries to sell them dual-use things which are not too obviously meant for military use, such as radios and electronics parts, navigation systems, emergency, rescue and medical technology.

What were the best military electronics and technology which Israel might sell in 1991? What kind of NVDs (and the level of GURPS Night Vision, as well as the drawbacks of the device)? How good is the Forward-Looking Infrared (FLIR) on a Search-And-Rescue (SAR) aircraft in 1991?

How good are commercial radio communications at this point in time and which manufacturer and models do you want for performance and security, in the different roles you need?

The roles would be:

  1. Genuinely concealed earpiece comms for clandestine operations (most likely of these not to exist in a practical form in March, 1991)
  2. Clandestine and encrypted (ideally OTP, but might be too cumbersome for the HQ to be of any help) communications from field team to HQ in the next country, which might be 50 km, but is more likely 150+ km
  3. Individual tactical radios for military communications
  4. Vehicle tactical radios
  5. Multi-channel, multi-role tactical radio command centers which can talk to anything from the soldiers on the ground to helicopters and scout aircraft in the air, as well as reach the HAG/FOB home base (determined by the range of the aircraft)
  6. Aircraft radios with long range

Please, no one feel obligated to try to reply the whole thing at once. I’d be happy if someone finds at least a single subject on that long list which interests them, and to hear the thoughts of people far more technologically-inclined than I will ever be on their one pet subject.

1 Like

One thing I suspect several of the more venerable discoursers here might know in some detail is whether Usenet, newsgroups, BBS or other Internet precursors could be used during clandestine or covert operations in foreign countries.

For one thing, in March 1991, what did you need to connect to and leave a message on a newsgroup or BBS hosted in the UK, if you wanted to do so from Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary or even the USSR?

If you had a modem and access to a telephone line you had illegally connected to your sophisticated electronics setup in order to violate laws against privacy and espionage, what would have to be included in your electronics kit and what else would you need to connect to the far distant BBS or equivalent?

Could ‘phone phreaking’ methods which enabled free long-distance calls in the US or UK work at all in what was, until recently, East Germany? Could they work in the Soviet Union?

And could you embed some sort of encoded message within the innocuous message you send, so that it can be downloaded only by someone who knows to use their cursor to click certain letters in certain words, in order?

I can’t speak for BBSes and my USENET experience is a little later, but in the UK:

  • Internet access is primarily for universities and companies with a strong presence in the relevant field.
  • That said, CIX exists (under that name since 1988) Pipex from 1990; Demon from 1992. You can do it if you want to.
  • So hosting the service in the UK is a possible thing.

Physically you can’t guarantee access to telephone sockets. I don’t know when the various countries adopted them. So you want an acoustic coupler that will fit at least the most common handset designs. You could splice wires in directly, but that’ll leave evidence on the phones you use. You probably won’t get great bandwidth; 1200 or 2400 would be impressive, 300 not unusual. (If you’re going somewhere with sockets, some kind of universal adaptor set for them too.) Plus the modem itself, I don’t think they get built into computers until the late 1990s..

The East German listeners will know there’s some sort of modem signal going on. Keep it short!

I don’t have details but I know the eastern bloc systems were much more manual; at the very least the same techniques won’t work.

If you are prepared to use the Internet you want to parasite off a local university. But chances are they’ll be heavily monitored, dangeous academics and all that.

Steganography is easy, the only problem is the dilution ratio, i.e. how much innocuous text do you have to send in order to combine an innocent-looking message with the vital content. If you’ve got someone with a cover of, say, trying to drum up new business and sending daily boring reports to his bosses back home, that gets relatively easy.

1 Like

Oh, and PGP is out in 1991, so you can get actual good encryption for the first time without being a government or big corp.

Probably illegal to possess in many places. Certainly is in France.

If we have senior DGSE officers, numerous contract employees and a high-level presidential advisor on Francafrique supporting the operation and at least one relatively senior SIS manager in the UK, in which country do we want to host? Does being on the other side of the Channel and thus at least one less country away remove some complexity, of having to go through multiple phone networks, or is that irrelevant?

Or maybe in Switzerland? Are there any advantages to having the person who receives reports stationed at CERN, perhaps an engineer working there?

There is a personal conection by a character which could plausibly lead to a recruitment, if there are benefits to hosting there.

The cover could be photojournalists, who file stories and pictures. The pictures would take forever to send and probably be unuseable in any media, but how many ordinary KGB counterintelligence men would know that in 1991? There were a lot of real journalists in Poland, Russia and other places previously hard to get into in 1991, as they were granting visas to almost everyone who applied.

If hosting in the UK is just as good as France or Switzerland, the question would be if a Professor of Russian Literature at Cambridge could access a networked terminal with enough privacy to open an encrypted, secret file with the report? He’s not a tech-person, as such, but he could be lent a perfectly decent post-graduate student in Mathematics interested in Russia because of his interest in chess grandmasters, who could claim for a semester to be deepening his understanding of Kasparov by learning his language and reading the formative literature of his life.

In many ways, it would be best if there was some advantage to CERN in Switzerland, and if a HQ set up near CERN, using and paying for their good telecommunications infrastructure and maybe even leasing computing time for tasks where lots of computing resources would help. They’re already using Geneva as a centrally-located HQ for logistical and financial support.

One of the real difficulties in using a telephone, whether for voice or data, from Eastern Europe to somewhere in the west is getting an international trunk. There weren’t many, access was restricted, and a human was very likely listening. I would be very surprised if normal civilian telephones had dial access to them, meaning you’d have to ask the operator to place the call for you…

1 Like

I’m aware you could not dial normally from a phone. It would have to be the old trick of dressing as municipal workers, brazenly connecting to a line which led to the outside world, while pretending to be putting in a new line. Which you would probably need to bribe someone who does phone installs to point out for you.

Not with standard protocols and formats. Those, at the time, transfer text as bare characters: no HTML, no text formatting, no fonts, nothing like that. You can transfer image files, which can have messages hidden within them, but if someone is snooping the call, the possibility of a hidden message is obvious, although the actual presence of a message is not. You also need the correct software to extract such a message.

The idea of clicking specific sequences of letters in standard BBS or communications software of the time to reveal a message hidden from the operators of the 'phone system is laughable. If it happened in a game I was playing that was meant to be even slightly realistic, my disbelief-suspenders would immediately fail, and the game could only be restored by retcon. It’s an idea that belongs strictly in deep Illuminati settings.

Teletext systems had “reveal message” functionality, but that message was transferred in cleartext, and was only concealed from the end-user. Anyone snooping the data stream would have it without effort.

Yes, that specific thing doesn’t work, but with custom software at each end you could do something similar. You just need lots of cover text.

For example “take every seventh letter, extract the third-lowest bit, concatenate those into 5-bit character codes”. You’ll need to choose your wording quite carefully when composing the cover message, but it ought to be doable. But each letter of message needs 35 letters of cover.

Which in turn means you probably want a codebook so that “TPD” means “mission compromised, extract at point X soonest” and in turn that means unreliable humans memorising things, or a codebook that has to survive searches.

I was aware of the practice of embeding messages within pictures, but unsure about the practicalities of sending a picture as part of your message. On a slow connection, wouldn’t sending just one picture potentially take hours?

If and when the people pretending to be journalists can send a message containing a picture to the BBS (or any Internet precursor you recommend as best for receiving and sending encoded messages which appear innocuous, through stegonography), they would do so. But if they are connecting through inherently risky subterfuge and each minute they spend there increases the odds that someone notices, they’d want to send something which would be quick to send, but still contain a message. That message might be encoded through technological means, if practical, but if not, a book code would be an acceptable option.

For the first mission, where the PCs and their support personnel go to Berlin and nearby locales, the Stasi, which would have been listening, has been dissolved, and any kind of surveillance or wiretapping on the citizens of newly unified Germany is a sensitive political subject. There, at least, journalists ought to be able to pay for access to a phone line where they can make international calls, which I hope would be enough for them to connect to their message board.

What I don’t know is what else you need than a modem. In my own, fairly non-technical experience, modems connect to the Internet and presumably its precursors through an ISP, which no doubt have lots of technology I never see and don’t know anything about. Can someone very tech savvy set up a connection without an ISP? That is, carry with them the hardware to handle all the parts of a connection which an ISP would usually do?

It would be possible to arrange a briefing by an ex-Stasi expert in the phone line infrastructure in former East Germany before they go, so they could take the right hardware with them, and know where to stay for the best connections to the outside world, now no longer monitored as a matter of course.

OK the first question is the path to digital. broadly the options are:

computer → serial port → modem → acoustic coupler → analogue phone line → modem at the other end

(for “acoustic coupler” you can substitute “phone jack”, and always should if they’re available.)

That can work over an international phone call, but not well; the more analogue signal path is involved, the more intervening switches, the more the signal will degrade.

This is why what you want, though in the field of operations it doesn’t exist yet, is an ISP. That has a bank of modems (or modem-equivalents, I won’t get into that) relatively close to you, so you dial into it and get your signal back into nice clean digital form. After which you can bundle it up in a variety of ways.

FIDOnet is basically done entirely over phone lines, but with reconciliation after each hop. (I dial into my local BBS, and address a message to Bob at his local BBS, and as BBSes talk to each other the message will gradually be carried and may eventually be delivered. Those inter-BBS connections are still intermittent phone calls, but each BBS in turn has the ability to say “that message is corrupt, send it again” until it has a clean copy.) This was a big thing in the 1980s and 1990s in Eastern Europe and the USSR/CIS. FidoNet - Wikipedia

The better option is to get onto the actual Internet, but that’s much harder to achieve and will basically need the collaboration (knowing or otherwise) of a major local university; there may still be telephony links, especially at first, but they tend to be better set up and run. At this date, messages work similarly: UUCP - Wikipedia

Tangentially relevant to this topic, from Mastodon this morning:

1 Like

While I have no specific detailed technical knowledge of communication, computing and surveillance technology of the time - other than my memories as an older teenage student - have you looked at games written in that era covering such genres? In particular, the James Bond rpg or, one of our favourites of the time, Ninjas & Superspies rpg from Palladium Systems? Ninjas & Superspies had a breakdown of the skills and equipment required for such covert communication and surveillance devices, even though they were never much required in our games, and had a great section on creating agency groups (friendly or enemy) and classifying their resources and organisation.

Another source would be some of the popular action movies or tv series of the time. Of immediate note, things like the SEAL magna-phone (?) from Under Siege, for example.

It’s easy enough to get the cooperation of a university in the UK (a Cambridge professor of Russian Literature was already involved as a talent spotter and there are London-based senior people with lots of resources and/or influence), France (through the DGSE officers supporting this) or Switzerland (Geneva is the location of headquarters and some of the senior people and the cover companies are located in Bern, Zurich or Zug). It might also be arranged in Austria, which in a wonderful legal quirk does not criminalize espionage unless you are spying on Austria, and is thus a very popular country with people who are not Austrian citizens and spying on a third country.

Is there any benefit to having the receiving end at the very cutting edge of networked communications and the early incarnations of Internet-esque things if the sender is still limited to a simple international phone line and any hardware he can carry in a van disguised as the equipment of tech-savvy journalists?

Would the writers of James Bond or Ninjas and Superspies have had any reason to know or care what was actually possible, as opposed what Bond might use in a movie or ninjas and superspies might use in cartoons?

A long delay between sending the message and the HQ receiving them is not ideal, but if they do not need to be physically present for all of that interval, but instead leave behind the equipment connected to the international phoneline, ideally somewhere no one is likely to find it for a couple of days, alternatively, maybe just among other hardware where no one thinks it is out of place or suspicious, it starts to look much more practical.

What kind of equipment would you need to leave connected for your end to be a barebones BBS or any networked message function with equivalent capacity for sending messages with heavily pixellated pictures? How expensive, how heavy and how bulky? In roughly reverse order of importance, with bulk mattering most for concealing it.

You don’t.

You use an existing BBS, run by a local, who may or may not know what you’re up to, and connect to it periodically to check for new messages.

Ah, excellent.

Both East Germany and Poland had underground BBS networks before the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and some of them were connected to FidoNet in 1990 or earlier. Many of them were hosted illegally in the homes of young students and counter-culture revolutionaries, on primitive computers like Amstrads or Commodore 64.

Humboldt University, TU Berlin and TU Dresden might have better connections and three months after unification, now that connecting a computer to a phone line isn’t illegal, some students there are likely taking full advantage of the increased freedom and the possibility of acquiring Western electronics legally by setting up BBS which run on the university computers, but they can access from their nearby dorms and/or other student housing within walking distance of the university.

The fixed conversion rate agreed on as part of unification for the DDR Marks and Deutsche Marks favored those who owned only modest savings, as students from economically comfortable families often do, as all their assets converted at the 1:1 rate, massively increasing their actual purchasing power when it came to imported electronics.

What skill would be used by a foreign agent of student age, who was active on many Usenet, BBS and newsgroups among Dutch-, English- and French-speaking students and working IT professionals, to find these German or Polish BBS and other early networks in those countries?

Area Knowledge (Internet) seems less applicable than in modern campaigns, when all these network ecosystems actually connect to the Internet. Area Knowledge (BBS)? Area Knowledge (Usenet)? Area Knowledge (FidoNet)? Area Knowledge ([Geographic region] Networks)?

Or Current Affairs (Science and Technology), with unfamiliarity and Cultural Familiarity penalties as appropriate?

I could see it being “BBS scene”; Fido is where most of it is but that feels restrictive. (I constantly fight against my own tendency to overspecialise things: GURPS needs to be playable.) You might have a familiarity for a particular country but it wouldn’t last more than a year or so.