British Intelligence, the End of the Cold War, the Peace Dividend and RIF-ed Officers in 1990-1991

When the Berlin Wall fell, the Warsaw Pact was dissolved, Soviet satellite states were finally free to hold multi-party elections and the USSR looked like it might tear itself apart, explode, implode or any combination of these things, there was a certain school of thought which held that we had reached the End of History.

Less philosophically and more pragmatically, there was a general feeling among politicians and even the general public that there was no longer an evident reason to keep all those uniformed men under arms and there almost certainly did not need to be all those intelligence chaps, military or civilian, spying on a world devoid of any Evil Empires.

When did the UK start Reductions-In-Force (RIF) among its intelligence community?

From what I can tell, older officers were often offered early retirements, especially those who accepted such offers in the early stages, before politicial players have secured sufficient bureaucratic support to dismiss Civil Servants or any related species out of hand. Later, the cuts were anything but voluntary and many trained intelligence officers were left looking for new careers.

Were there any cuts among the traditional muscle of UK intelligence, SAS, SBS, the forerunner of the Special Reconnaissance Regiment and the like? Perhaps there would not have been, as Northern Ireland remained an unsolved problem for the security services. That also means that MI5, SIS and Military Intelligence officers with Northern Ireland specializations might be more likely to be safe in their positions.

Soviet and Eastern European experts would have few arguments to make against suggestions they be made redundant.

What about Africa hands? Would UK intelligence try to keep networks of agents in Africa if there were no Soviet menace to worry about there?

What fields of expertise would see the most talented, well-trained and experienced officers RIF-ed in 1990-1991, simply for no longer being perceived as necessary or justified?

1 Like

Not as much as you might think. Mi6 reportedly suffered a 25% reduction in the 90s as part of a cost review - mainly in the Middle East and Africa. That had a direct impact on our intelligence around Iraq leading into the 2000s.

Mi5 didn’t see anything as heavy - they already had a strong role because of Ireland, and had a strong counter-terrorism brief for the UK as the Islamist threat was rising. So operationally they pretty much carried on - though there was a lot of retraining and refocussing as they moved from a primarily counter-intelligence agency (which requires much less evidence to act) than a counter-terrorism one (which bears a much heavier legal burden). Source on that was a speech and Q&A with Stella Rimmington that I attended a few years back.

GCHQ fumbled the ball a bit. As part of the comprehensive review they didn’t come across well and lost £100million of their £850 million budget - quite a chunk in 1993. They got that back by 2000 though.

You might have a look at this: Intelligence Services Act 1994 - Wikipedia - if you haven’t seen it already. That was the UK bringing the intelligence services under one piece of legislation, and in many cases out of the darkness. Related is this: https://hansard.parliament.uk/Lords/1996-03-13/debates/50178247-7504-4a9f-8c72-05c9926137aa/IntelligenceAndSecurityServices - it’s an official transcript of a speech in the UK House of Lords from 1996, concerning the Intelligence Services Act and its implementation,.

I’d also caution against having a RIF mindset - strange as it may seem intelligence officers (especially post 1994) are civil servants in the UK, and as such, there’s rarely widespread redundancies and dismissals. Far more often that people are reassigned, and functions repurposed. After all, you never know when you might need that thing again.

Special Forces are a different matter - as best I can tell, there was no reduction in numbers in the SAS and related services during the 90s. The world continued to be a dangerous place.

Oh, and it should go without saying that September 11, 2001, reversed an awful lot of things.

It is true that in the UK, many civilian intelligence officers are, officially at least, Civil Servants. This means that they cannot be simply dismissed, but they can be offered early retirement or other favourable terms to induce them to resign of their own free will, with the possibility of major reorganization of their arms of government, e.g. the Russia/Eastern Europe desk losing its primacy and becoming just another regional desk, allowing the Civil Servants who are surplus to requirement under a new functional schema to be legally made redundant.

Even if some Civil Servants in the SIS were inclined to fight for their job, if their former career track no longer exists, because there aren’t twenty senior Case Officers covering Russia, there’s just two, many people would seek out alternate employment, rather than stay somewhere promotions are functionally no longer a thing. Between 1989 and 2001, many technological advances made intelligence-gathering easier, but with politicians promising a Peace Dividend now that the Cold War had finally ended, most intelligence services made budget cuts among the agent-handlers who produce HUMINT.

Yet most countries did demonstratably allow capacities to be lost, ones they wished later they still possessed when they needed them again. More or less every senior officer of Special Operations Forces in the Western world had to explain to their political masters that it takes many years to train and educate SOF personnel and you cannot simply turn on a money tap and instantly reverse a decade of budget cuts, limited prospects and fewer recruits. Most of those who went private were gone and new people would take time before they were capable of doing the job. One suspects much the same was said within intelligence and security agencies, albeit possibly with plummer accents.

It couldn’t very well reverse things which had happened. It changed a lot, but it did not change them back to how they were during the Cold War.

Those intelligence officers who took early retirement mostly didn’t come back a decade later and the thriving private sector in the intelligence, military and security space continued growing apace. Some of the people who’d been allowed to leave, sometimes even encouraged to leave, came back as consultants, doing the same job, just for a lot more money. And a whole new generation was trained and educated, but now they might be planning to quit and go into the private sector in their thirties, having seen how much money was to be made there.

In any case, my campaign is set in 1991. I care about the area of expertise for SIS officers who are being offered early retirement, and how soon the most senior level of professional SIS officers, directly below political appointees, know where the cuts will hit and roughly how bad. No one in the campaign knows the future or is basing their decisions on terrorist attacks which have not happened.

Dude - why do you bother asking questions then just disagreeing with people who give you informed answers?

1 Like

Essentially, after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the unprecedented events which followed, including the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, a very senior analyst from the CIA met informally with a long-time counterpart from SIS. Both of them had been case officers in their youth. Her career even extended back to WWII, where she had lived in London as part of the Czechoslovak Government in Exile and worked with the SOE to contact Czech and Slovak partisans behind enemy lines. After the war, she and her husband emigrated to the United States where they both worked in the field of national security for the next several decades, she in the CIA and he in the US Army Special Forces.

Her English counterpart had been a young Royal Marine Commando officer during the Suez Crisis, before he took a Classics degree at Oxford and had a respectable field career with SIS, and an even finer headquarters one. As a senior counterintelligence officer promoted to the upper management, as high as a career SIS officer was likely to rise, his recommendations were vital to promotions and his tepid endorsement could spell the end of a career.

She tells him, truthfully, that the end of the Warsaw Pact and the unraveling of the Soviet Union will mean major defence cuts in the US. Those cuts will no doubt affect intelligence as well, especially HUMINT, which lacks the pizzaz and highlight reels of satellite photos, intercepted messages and cracked codes. HUMINT is unreliable, requires cultural sensitivity and historical context, the building of trust and relationships, and in the end, there are no guarantees that it’s not all lies.

Also truthfully, she tells him that she will retire. It is time and past time. She only lasted this long to see the Evil Empire fall. Her husband and her son, both Special Forces veterans, have already been hired as security consultants in the private sector. She knew it would pay better, but was shocked to find out how much better. Oil and gas companies operate in the Middle East, Central and South America, Africa and Asia, sometimes near or even in areas where ethnic strife or civil war is going on. Security consultants who know the cultures and languages are cheap at any price if they prevent sabotage, kidnapping for ransom or any interruptions to production due to civil strife.

And a lot of companies looking to be the first to reap the benefits of markets in Eastern Europe and Central Asia need people who speak the language, have local contacts and know the dangers as well as opportunities. They’ll pay big money for case officers who’ve operated in the right countries.

So, she asks him if there are any good officers, maybe even great, who seem unlikely to have a place in a leaner, more modern, less wasteful SIS. Perhaps proteges of his, people who were courageous, loyal, dedicated and creative, but would be wasted as bureaucrats analyzing open-source intelligence. If they’ve got African experience, especially oil-rich countries like Angola, Nigeria or Zaire, or Soviet/Eastern Europe credentials, including languages and cultural familiarities, she might be able to put them in touch with private consulting firms who’d at least double their income.

When does it become clear to the senior SIS man that not everyone will keep their jobs? That it is not a realistic goal and he should work toward helping those least suited for a peacetime SIS find employment more in line with their interests and inclinations? And what skill sets and specializations are least likely to be valued in the new, post-Cold War SIS?

Because I can’t really do much with a 25% reduction over the 1990s for a campaign set in 1991. Every literate person in the Western world who was alive during that time was aware that cuts were made over the 1990s. Aside from period sources during the 1990s, it was a frequent talking point in 2001-2005.

What I am looking for is much more specific and something a native reading their local papers in 1989-1991 is much more likely to have noticed than someone in a different country. That is, how many months passed from the fall of the Wall and until British politicians promised a Peace Dividend?

How long from such promises until there were some concrete programs of reorganization in defence, intelligence and security matters?

And, yes, which areas of expertise were valued for the new world order expected by the UK defence and intelligence community and which were suddenly over-represented? Bulgar, Czech, Hungarian, Polish, Russian, etc. speakers still had some perceived value, but far less than in 1988. It was not obvious that the Middle East would be a focus for Western intelligence and security services in a world expected to be monopolar, but the UK did have some traditional allegiances in the region.

I would expect some cuts in all geographic areas, most of all in spots where the UK only had any intelligence presence because the Soviets did. I’d also expect the former Warsaw Pact countries to see big cuts among area specialists devoted to both collection and analysis, but probably not before the Soviet armed forces left there.

Cool. Fill your boots.

Most of the time, I ask questions during research into roleplaying game relevant information largely to formulate the questions for myself. It’s not that I don’t want answers, it’s just that it’s relatively rare for anyone to know exactly all the information I need. For that matter, it may not be apparent from my initial post what I need, as I am told that most people on the Internet are repulsed by walls of text longer than the average message on the cesspool formerly known as Twitter.

Most answers I get are not in themselves enough for me to run the campaign, no further information necessary. That would be an unreasonable expectation. The most useful answers are generally the ones which spark further discussion, refine the search parameters of the research I am doing, and sometimes include snippets of information I did not know. The nature of roleplaying campaigns, perhaps especially mine, is that I might need very exact historical information, much more precise than peer-reviewed scholarship, but fortunately with more license to embroider and invent in the gaps, for a certain period of time when the campaign is set and the last few months before it. That means March 1991 and the events of the last 15-16 months before it. I would be very happy if the campaign lasted long enough for us to play out the year of 1991, but based on the usual pace of my campaigns and how reluctant I’ve been in the past to do time skips, it would be a miracle if anything which happens 1992 comes up in my campaign and I can safely say that nothing which happens 1993 or later is relevant to what will happen in the campaign, simply because it would take me decades to play out that far. I’ll try to be better about time skips and pacing, but even if I manage to have more time pass during the campaign than I usually manage, the campaign is about taking advantage of a specific moment in time, the End of History, as Francis Fukuyama so infamously put it.

I want to note specifically that just because I have comments on answers doesn’t mean that I don’t value them. I do value them and it costs me nothing to acknowledge that. The rules of courtesy are not universal across all cultures and, believe it or not, Icelanders are usually rather reticent. Or, rather, we often do not state out loud things we feel are evident. That is different from the UK, US and many other places, where gratitude is expected to be acknowledged verbally, even in situations where that would make Icelanders feel awkward and performative.

I do appreciate the answers from @jfs, especially the data that SIS made significant cuts in the area of Middle East and African expertise. A 25% reduction in manning, in terms of any government institution anywhere, amounts to massive cuts, as the usual tendency is for bureaucracies to grow larger over time, not shrink. So, thank you, @jfs.

I still need to figure out when senior SIS officials knew that the cuts would be this bad. Most of them expected politicians to demand budget cuts, naturally. Given how much centrally the menace of the Soviet Union had featured in the array of justifications for having armed forces, intelligence and security services of the size they were in 1988, the implosion of that external threat made for a very difficult task when it came to justifying their existing budget in 1990 and 1991.

At first, some hay might be made with arguments that the uncertainty and weakness of the Soviet Union created unprecedented dangers in areas such as nuclear proliferation, as it was vital to not only keep track of all the nuclear weapons possessed by the Soviet Union, but also ensure that the post-USSR world order did not end up with those weapons distributed between multiple states, which might be much more dangerous than the mutually-assured destruction between two opposed camps had been. While that might justify not cutting loose all Russian-speakers and Soviet experts, it probably would not be sufficient to avoid cuts among SIS personnel focused on other countries of the Warsaw Pact, no longer threats, but potential allies. Or even current allies, in the case of East Germany, re-united with West Germany again.

It may well be that there are no open-source publications on the nuts and bolts of the budget cuts within the UK intelligence community. The CIA is the most commonly cited intelligence agency by clinically paranoid patients mostly because it is the world’s most accessible and open intelligence agency. The American media cover details about the agency and any reorganizations of it in a way that UK media seems to avoid, due to different laws in these matters and perhaps also due to different norms among editors.

Maybe there is no way to figure out how much of the 25% over 12-13 years was spread out, if cuts had already started by 1990, and whether SIS case officers had already started looking for new careers. In which case I’ll have to make it up, as GMs, unlike reputable and careful historians, can’t let ignorance stop them from making decisions about what NPCs do or what background other recent hires than the PCs have.

Making it up is not problematic in itself, but before I make anything up, I like to make sure that it doesn’t directly contradict historical sources. Even if a given NPC is a fictional person, their background should be as historically plausible as the background of some real people. That is one reason why it is helpful to ask questions. Other reasons include details like that Middle East and African expertise was lost during the decade plus of 1989-2001. That is potentially a very useful snippet of data, one I will try to investigate further.

Aside from trying to find out how much of those coming cuts was already evident by 1990-1991, I’d also like to find out if all regions suffered similar cuts, and the Middle East and Africa were mentioned specifically because that was an area where having made those cuts later turned out to have harmed the national interest, or if that region was actually harder hit than all the others by post-Cold War budget cuts. If so, what was it that kept all the Eastern Europe experts and speakers of Bulgar, Czech, Polish, etc. relevant even though the Cold War ended, but eroded capabilities in the Middle East and Africa?

If the Middle East and Africa were uniquely hard hit by budget cuts and reorganizations within SIS, it might have been because much of what they were doing in those areas was focused on countering Soviet influence. With Soviet influence gone, senior Civil Servants and politicians in the UK may have regarded less SIS capability in Africa and the Middle East as perfectly acceptable. Thinking out loud, however, it still seems hard to justify keeping all the Eastern European capabilities intact, given that East Germany went from critical focus point of two opposing ideological camps and the probable ground zero, in every sense, of any cataclysmic war to come, to an economically-deprived region of an allied country with few major security or strategic implications. On the other hand, maybe the fact that the East European / Soviet desk was the most prestigious one during the Cold War meant that they had the most bureaucratic power to resist changes. Definitely something to look into and mull over, try to figure out exactly what happened to all those East European and Soviet experts within SIS.

And figure out how the fictional senior SIS official would reply to the fictional senior CIA one about talented proteges with African or Eastern Europe/Soviet background who might not find much contentment or success in a post-Cold War SIS, but would be great hires for anyone in the private sector looking for intelligence expertise on Africa or Eastern Europe.

Ok, so I’ve found some helpful sources which deal with the subject. There is Philip Davies, with MI6 and the Machinery of Spying: Structure and Process in Britain’s Secret Intelligence (Studies in Intelligence), and specifically the chapter from p. 296-305 about the changes around the end of the Cold War that matter here.

The first time Western intelligence officers started discussing a post-Cold War world actually happened a few weeks before the Berlin Wall fell. The US intelligence community was in the minority when it came to their threat estimates of the USSR in 1989, as in October 1989, a conference held in Ottawa by the Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies, where the subject was the purpose and direction of intelligence and security services in a post-Cold War world.

Gordon Thomas’s Secret Wars: One Hundred Years of British Intelligence Inside MI5 and MI6 is more anecdotal and personal than what Davies did, which was to apply the tools of sociology to analyze organizations, their function and their incentives. As a result, there are no good specifics in it, but the general feeling was apparently that with glasnost and perestroika, there was a foreseeable risk that the Soviet Union would stop being as relevant to UK security as it had been during the Cold War, and intelligence officers had best establish that they were irreplaceable or else find a new job as soon as possible.

From the summer 1990, a lot of SIS staff resigned because they had options in private industry. As did many MoD personnel. In a very British way, a senior Civil Servant, Sir Michael Quinlan, was commissioned to conduct a review of the Secret Intelligence Service, at the same time such reviews were ongoing all over the MoD and subordinate commands. Thousands of Civil Servants were let go, generally by removing the department they worked at and combine it with something else, but many of them received monetary awards under the deeply corrupt system of Civil Servants, who get paid for not working and then get paid even more if they are sent home and told never to do any more work.

This was the famous ‘peace dividend’ promised by the politicians (and cited by name on p. 304 of MI6 and the Machinery of Spying: Structure and Process in Britain’s Secret Intelligence), but it took a long time for SIS to actually get around to forcing people to retire and making people redundant. It happened, all right, but not until the ‘Christmas massacre’ of 1993, where all the senior directors were let go at once and entire departments vanished (e.g. Africa was combined with the Middle East, so the SIS probably lost most of its officers who actually knew sub-Saharan Africa).

In the meantime, the Ministry of Defence had gone through even worse cuts, obviously affecting everyone other than the Civil Servants there far more. So, even though they got rid of thousands of Civil Servants, they reduced the number of military personnel so much more that proportionally, the place was more infested with Civil Servants than ever.

It seems fairly plausible that from summer 1990, it was known throughout SIS that the organization would see big cuts and whole departments would either vanish or be subsumed under other departments which had little in common with them culturally or geopolitically.

More or less all the distinguished old intelligence officers were forced to retire, because there are no Civil Servants as expensive as the long-serving ones. In 1993, the first SIS officer was given a computer and told to figure out how to find intelligence with that thing, with no help or budget beyond the initial machine. He did pretty well and they eventually caught up with the rest of the workforce, but evidently, 1991 SIS left technology to other agencies, so it’s not as if there existed some core of new, tech-savvy officers to form the basis of a whole new SIS. The early 1990s recruits were still pretty similar to the ones recruited in the 1950s.

MI5 had begun recruiting more women and seeking out graduates from universities other than Cambridge and Oxford. Granted, it was still mostly from universities which would form the Russel Group in 1994, but it was a massive culture change from the old boys’ network at SIS. In the time I’m concerned with, SIS has little diversity and the only concession to the new world they found themselves in was in establishing departments for counter-narcotics and counter-terror, though both started out small and underfunded.

Granted, SIS had already cut down before this. Famously, in 1982, there was one SIS employee in Buenos Aires, expected to cover not only all of Argentina, but literally all of Latin America. Having separate intelligence officers for Portuguese-speaking and Spanish-speaking Latin America was apparently too expensive, so just one guy covered that whole continent plus.

That example is pretty revealing, as it indicates how the coverage for all sorts of other countries will be. Anything not considered vitally important to ‘customers’ in Whitehall and the MoD was covered extremely thinly, if at all. So the coverage of individual sub-Saharan African countries will be shared with a bunch of other countries, which might not have much in common, under one, very over-stretched officer, who might qualify as an expert on one out of the twenty states he is supposed to cover.

The Civil Service mindset, which still largely applies at the date you’re working at, is that it’s a job for life unless you are blatantly and repeatedly dishonest. So you may be bored, but you’re bored on a senior salary with a nice house in the country.

I somehow suspect that recruits to the SIS might differ from the average Civil Servant. Depending on the era, they needed to pass the Civil Servant and/or any assessments or test used to select people for the diplomatic service, but specifically elected to work in a small bureaucracy (the largest SIS has been in its history was 1,200 people) where senior posts were fewer and the prestige of senior diplomatic staff was out of reach.

It could be duty, desire for excitment or something else, but most SIS staffers are there because they specifically wanted to work for the Secret Intelligence Service, not because they were looking for any job as Civil Servants, and SIS happened to be where they landed.

If an Africa specialist at SIS learns that there will likely not be a Controller/Africa in the new, post-Cold War SIS, and that maybe two out of six Africa specialists are likely to be retained under the Co/Middle East department, their options are to hope really hard they’ll be among those retained and they’ll be able to use their expertise in ways satisfying for them, or they could explore what else is out there for someone with their skill set, before they have to compete with thousands of MoD personnel also out of a job.

Just learning that the job for which they’d been manuevering for the past decade will disappear might affect their desire to stay or go. Early 1990s were a time when merchant banks and investment funds would potentially throw a lot of money at alleged cultural experts when seeking to break into new markets, especially if they had good recommendations from the right people.

It took until the end of 1993 to happen in the SIS, but Civil Servants in the MoD started to lose their jobs in summer of 1990. Yes, because they had certain legal protections, they were generally paid a lump sum, depending on their seniority, but often around £30,000, but I imagine that Civil Servants everywhere took note and regarded their positions as a little less secure. Negotiated early retirement was also used liberally to thin the herd of Civil Servants which were supposed to enable and facilitate the work of the airmen, sailors and soldiers of the armed forces, the number of whom were being slashed in half.

Much of Europe has special statutory protections for Civil Servants or their equivalents, but while firing them merely for not doing their jobs or simply being bad at them is nearly inconceivable, most legal codes contain exceptions when changing circumstances lead to a department being closed down. That could legally end the careers of dozens or even hundreds of Civil Servant equivalents who are totally protected from their own incompetence. The threat of doing so, even when everyone involved knows it would be difficult, is also likely to lead to a number of negotiated early retirements, with significantly more benefits than they’d get otherwise, even if not quite as much as if they managed an extra ten years on the job.

Any SIS personnel for whom the job is just another Civil Servant job won’t mind taking a transfer to some part of the Civil Service where there is no pressure to make cuts. Or resign early. The people whom Mrs. Kocourek wants from her slightly more senior British counterpart, now Director of Personnel and Administration, are the ones who would not accept a posting to some committee about roundabouts in Milton Keynes and public roads instead of their jobs at SIS. The ones who do this kind of work for the thrill or because they want to know all the secrets. The kind of SIS officers who’d make adventurers instead of Civil Servants.