There is a book by Aristotle that is called τὰ μετὰ τὰ φυσικά because it was the next one on the shelf after Φυσικὴ ἀκρόασις (the “Lectures on Nature”). “Metaphysical” means “next to natural”, but that doesn’t signify anything about its content.
Anyway, Aristotle’s Metaphysics deals with a rag-bag of topics such as ontology and epistemology that logical positivists assert have no field of study. It is the beginning of a raging 2,300-year That Argument about things that don’t even exist. The argument is called “metaphysics”, and has expanded to deal with, if it did not already cover them in Aristotle, the Mind-Body Problem and the Problem of Identity.
If you take a particular position on the Mind-Body Problem (physicalism) and a particular position on the problem of identity you will reach the conclusion that to have a copy of yourself made in Chicago and then shoot yourself in the head is a form of transportation*. There is even a position that leads to the conclusion that running a simulation of your brain on a computer in Chicago would count.
If you go even further than that it seems that a copy of your brain that was significantly different from your brain would still be you, provided that you were dead†. To people who accept that it seems that to have a copy of your brain made that has been edited to juvenilise senile features, and then to top yourself, is a form of immortality. Roger posits that, even though this position is absurd, a lot of people who are facing imminent death or senile dementia, having no other hope, will act on this belief because Buckley’s chance is better than none. Also that people with the necessary skills could be found to do the copying and killing‡ involved.
In Flat Black the necessary position on the Mind-Body Problem (physicalism) has been established empirically. It is demonstrated that anything immaterial about the mind has no causal effects on anything observable. What I want to say is that few people are sufficiently convinced of the proposition that similarity is identity that they will actually go through with expensive suicide under the delusion that it is transportation or rejuvenation.
Perhaps “ontological” is the word I want.
* Many explanations for how teleportation might work amount to this, “beaming” in Star Trek among them. Some time in the last decade or so I read an SF story in which the interstellar transport system did work this way. The central character was responsible for disposing of the corpses and trying to discourage people from thinking about it too much. Something went wrong, there was a delay in confirming the signal, and he delayed killing the passenger with the usual huge dose of x-rays. The delay dragged on, he had to let her out of the transport booth. Then when the signal was confirmed a few hours later he had to beat her to death with a crowbar.
† After all, the future you is going to be different from the current you anyway, and identity is continuous through time, right? (See: the Problem of Theseus’ Ship.)
‡ In the first Flat Black campaign the PCs met a very old, very rich man and the lifelike robot in which his mind emulation was running. The doctors who had been would not commit the necessary murder and the old guy chickened out from the suicide. He died after a while, and one of the PCs married the robot.
¶ Back in '83 I took a sophomore philosophy course in the philosophy of the mind. Only got a Credit, though. If you’re interested in the field I recommend The Mind’s I by Hofstadter, R. & Dennett, D., Penguin Books 1981. ISBN 0-14-006253-X It’s an anthology of essays and extracts from the work of people who take different views on this subject, with commentary by Dennett and Hofstadter, and a lot of it is charmingly written.